Trumps new security strategy. Does it reshape the global order?

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The American National Security Strategy, which was published in early December

2025, has been extensively discussed since. Does it really mark a real change in

international relations? Does it redefine spheres of influence in a fundamental way?

Russia has offered cautiously positive reactions, while China remains notably silent.

The rest of the world grapples with the problem of understanding what the strategy

may mean for how we all see the world. Is the strategy to be seen as a transactional

negotiating bid, or does it really contain fundamental elements of perception that are

not up for negotiation?

Moscows response to the strategy has been very visible. It has been praised as

largely consistent with Russia;s vision of international relations. The document

avoids labeling Russia as a direct threat to the United States. For the US, the

strategy calls for reestablishing strategic stability with Russia, and identifies swift

negotiation of an end to hostilities in Ukraine as a core American interest. This is a

dramatic shift from earlier US positions characterizing Russia as a revisionist power,

threatening the international order.

There is a clear connection to the notion of spheres of influence, which becomes

evident when looking at the strategys revival of the Monroe Doctrine. It is now being

termed the Trump corollary. American primacy throughout the Western hemisphere

is being asserted. United States will deny those outside this hemisphere the ability to

position forces or other threatening capabilities in the Americas. This means a return

to traditional geopolitical thinking based on regional spheres rather than universal

principles.

Implicitly, no doubt this is being interpreted in Russia as offering them something

similar in their near abroad. The strategy calls for the end of NATO enlargement and

criticizes the way Europe is coming together. It indicates American acceptance of

differentiated security zones.

This is more or less what Russia was asking for before the full-scale invasion of

Ukraine, and most visibly heard during the visit of Foreign Minister Lavrov to

Stockholm in the end of 2021. The document does not explicitly acknowledge

Russian spheres of influence in Central Asia, the Caucuses or Eastern Europe. But

the principle of primacy of nations and respect for sovereignty opens room for such

arrangements.

Where Nixon sought rapprochement with China to counterbalance Soviet power,

Trump appears to pursue improved relations with Russia. In this way, he may be

hoping for being able to focus more on the China challenge and avoid that Russia

forms a coalition with China. The question remains whether Moscow will accept a

subordinate role in this arrangement or continue its deepening partnership with

China.

Beijings muted response to the strategy contrasts sharply with Moscow's

enthusiasm. Its foreign ministry urges the United States to handle the Taiwan issue

with utmost caution and thereby signals uncertainty regarding the permanence of the

newly declared American intentions. China is known for looking for the long term,

perhaps being uncertain about how long Trump and his ideas will govern U.S. policy.

The strategy is much softer on China in comparison with earlier declarations. No

longer is China being characterized as having incompatible strategic visions with the

U.S. Instead, the document envisions a genuinely mutually advantageous economic

relationship and balanced trade. It commits to opposing changes to Taiwans status

quo but avoids deeper discussion of ideology, human rights or Chinas regional

ambitions. Still, the question is if this posture is more tactical rather than strategic.

Strategy still identifies the Indo-Pacific as crucial to American interests and commits

to maintaining military capabilities to deter conflict over Taiwan.

What is really interesting is the fact that the strategy extends the notion of spheres of

interest beyond geography into thematic domains. On artificial intelligence, it

emphasizes that US technology and US standards, particularly in AI, biotech, and

quantum computing, must drive the world forward. This represents an attempt to

maintain American dominance in critical technologies, even while negotiating on

other issues.

The recent decision to allow NVIDIA to sell H200 AI chips to approved customers in

China illustrates the complexities involved. This suggests that the administration

seeks managed competition rather than complete decoupling, potentially exchanging

some technological access for other concessions, such as rare earth materials or

market access.

On strategic minerals and resources, the strategy emphasizes building the world's

most robust industrial base and maintaining the world's most robust, productive, and

innovative energy sector. This extends American sphere of interest concerns to

supply chains and resource access globally, not merely within the Western

Hemisphere. The emphasis on reducing dependency on foreign sources for critical

materials implicitly targets Chinese dominance in rare earth processing and battery

supply chains.

The strategy mentions Arctic concerns primarily through its hemispheric focus than

dedicating a separate section as previous strategies did. Yet actions speak louder

than the document structure. The administration's repeated interest in Greenland,

shifting its command to Northern Command, and Denmark's unprecedented

identification of the US as a potential security concern, all indicate that Arctic control

features prominently in American strategic thinking. Climate change has opened new

shipping routes and resource access, while Russian and Chinese activities in the

region have expanded. To what extent the US is willing to really negotiate with

Russia and China on a shared sphere of interests in this region is very unclear.

Perhaps most striking is the strategys apparent retreat from America's traditional

emphasis on promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The

document explicitly rejects what it calls imposing on them democratic or other social

change that differs widely from their traditions and histories. It criticizes OSCE and

other organizations for dictating social, national, social policy and treating the

transformation of domestic political life as one of its core functions. The US has

indeed threatened to withdraw from the OSCE unless it stops what Washington

characterizes as social engineering and focuses purely on security matters. This

directly contradicts the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which established human

rights as equal to military security concerns. This document has served as a

cornerstone of European security architecture for half a century.

The strategy criticizes Europe as undergoing a civilizational erasure and supports

what it terms patriotic European parties, signaling American willingness to work with

political forces, including far-right movements that challenge liberal democratic

norms if they align with other American interests. This pragmatic approach prioritizes

stability and favorable relations over political ideology.

The Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine receives extensive treatment in the

strategy. Beyond preventing hostile powers from establishing presence in the

Americas, the strategy identifies migration control, cartel elimination, and exclusion

of Chinese economic influence as core objectives.

Interestingly, there is no indication that Russias interest in Latin America faces more

vigorous American opposition than before. Venezuelan or Cuban relations with

Moscow appear less pressing concerns than Chinese port ownership, infrastructure

investments, and technology penetration. This suggests American tolerance for

some Russian activities in the hemisphere, provided that they don't threaten core

American interests like the Panama Canal.

The strategy&s treatment of NATO allies has generated anxiety across Europe. While

it maintains formal commitment to the alliance, the document's harsh criticism of

European weakness, its demand that allies spend 5% on defense, and its emphasis

on burden shifting rather than burden sharing all signal reduced American

willingness to guarantee European security. Most concerning for allies is language

about reconsidering partnership if European countries undergo demographic

changes that make them majority non-European. It clearly positions American

security guarantees as transactional arrangements requiring constant renegotiation

rather than permanent commitment based on shared values.

For industries and trading companies, this strategy creates both opportunities and

risks. The emphasis on rebalancing trade relationships, protecting intellectual

property, and rebuilding domestic industrial capacity suggests more protectionist

policies ahead. Companies dependent on Chinese manufacturing or European

markets face uncertainty about tariffs, export controls, and market access. The

technology sectors face a particularly difficult situation. Firms must navigate

inconsistent signals on China policy while anticipating that technological advantage

remains a nonnegotiable American priority. Defense contractors may benefit from

increased spending demands on allies, but face questions about technology sharing

and coproduction arrangements if American reliability seems uncertain.

The issue of how much is enough in terms of seeking a positive American

relationship with the US through sending positive signals in the direction of

Washington. No one knows. If the American approach is purely transactional, there

never may be an end to American demands on European concessions.

Lars-Erik Lundin

tidigare publicerad av Consilio AB